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I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Remedying the lingering effects of racial discrimination has long been
one of the most profound moral and constitutional challenges facing our
nation. Where discrimination has been so pervasive that it has prevented
many Americans from enjoying the basic privileges of citizenship-an
equal opportunity to buy homes, attend schools, attain government con-
tracts and find jobs-serious progress can be achieved only through strong
efforts to include minorities in areas from which historically they have
been excluded.
During the last several decades, the American public, acting through
democratic and representative processes, has concluded time and again
that serious remedial efforts sometimes require race-conscious programs
designed to incorporate members of minority groups into areas from
which they have too often been excluded. Remedial efforts of this sort
have occurred in government at the federal, state, and local levels, in a
* In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct.
706 (1989), municipal governments throughout the nation rushed to re-examine, or in some instances
to dismantle, their affirmative action programs. The Organization for a New Equality (ONE), a non-
profit organization concerned with expanding economic opportunity for minorities, believed that many
cities were in danger of acting precipitously and with insufficient guidance as to Croson's meaning.
To meet that perceived need for expert guidance, the Reverend Charles Stith, ONE's President, asked
Professor Laurence Tribe to convene on short notice a Constitutional Scholars' Conference on
Affirmative Action. That conference took place at Boston's historic African Meeting House on March
30, 1989. The following statement, with only minor changes, was unanimously released by the
conference. Eighteen of the thirty signatories were able to attend personally, all at their own expense;
the others participated by telephone.
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variety of institutional settings. These efforts should be seen in their his-
torical context, and for their underlying purpose-not as a return to the
exclusionary practices of the past but, on the contrary, as an attempt to
include all Americans as first-class citizens. Such remedial measures in-
volve not a simple trade-off among individuals in different racial groups,
but rather a patriotic effort by all Americans to hasten the day when we
can truly say that we have become a color-blind nation.
In light of the Supreme Court's January 1989 decision in City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., some have recently argued that race-conscious
remedies by local and state governments should be regarded as conflicting
with the Constitution. As long-time students of constitutional law, we re-
gard this assessment as wrong. The Supreme Court has insisted that af-
firmative action programs be carefully designed-not dismantled. A call
for fairness and flexibility in affirmative action programs should never be
equated with a call for retrenchment and retreat. It would defy not only
the Supreme Court's decisions but the fundamental purposes of the equal
protection clause to conclude that the Constitution forbids all such inclu-
sive remedial measures, or requires that such measures be treated in ex-
actly the same way as the invidious discrimination of the nation's past.
Therefore, while it would be irresponsible for local governments to
avoid whatever steps are necessary to adjust their minority contract pro-
grams to the Supreme Court's ruling in the Croson decision, it would be
equally irresponsible for others to claim that this opinion casts doubt on
the overall constitutionality of properly constructed race-conscious
remedies.
II. CURRENT LAW
On at least four noteworthy occasions (Croson, Wygant, Fullilove, and
Bakke), the Supreme Court has made clear that affirmative action reme-
dies, if carefully devised, can be entirely constitutional. And while this
sensitive area of law will always contain areas of uncertainty, constitu-
tional scholars whose views span a wide spectrum can agree on certain
fundamental principles.
One: The equal protection clause of the Constitution was designed to
combat racial subordination and ensure that no one is ever subjugated to a
position of second-class citizenship simply because of racial identity. Mea-
sures that are designed to bring excluded groups into the societal main-
stream-to ensure equal citizenship for all Americans-promote the goals
of the equal protection clause and cannot be viewed as inherently contrary
to the Constitution simply because such inclusive measures must at times
take account of racial realities. While the Supreme Court has stated that
all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, nearly all mem-
bers of the Supreme Court have recognized that there is a critical moral
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and constitutional difference between governmental interests in employing
race to correct historic discrimination-or even to promote diversity-and
governmental interests in using race to advance debilitating stereotypes
and the perpetuation of racial exclusion.
Two: While the Supreme Court has concluded that societal discrimina-
tion by itself cannot justify most race-conscious programs, the Court has
also rejected the notion that local governments may implement such reme-
dial programs only if they bear the tortuous and often divisive burden of
documenting specific incidents of purposeful past discrimination on identi-
fied occasions. Rather, the Court has recognized the permissibility of bas-
ing flexible race-conscious remedial goals upon relevant statistical compar-
isons. Nothing in Croson should be seen to alter this principle, established
in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.
Three: The Supreme Court has rejected the notions that race-conscious
affirmative action measures adopted by a local government or other body
must as a constitutional matter be limited to redressing the effects of that
government's or body's own past discrimination, or to making whole the
actual victims of identified incidents of past discrimination. In addition,
although the Court's opinions have been less than clear on the subject, the
Supreme Court has not held that minority set-aside programs initiated
before the Croson decision must be dismantled simply because the facts
justifying such programs had not been fully developed at the time those
programs were put in place.
Four: In some social and economic contexts, race-conscious affirmative
action is justified not only as a means of rectifying past discrimination, but
also as a forward-looking way of promoting racial harmony and ensuring
that discrimination will be eliminated in the future. In educational set-
tings particularly, ever since Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme
Court has recognized not only the crucial role of racial integration in fa-
cilitating equal opportunity but also the positive educational value of as-
suring racial diversity and facilitating multiracial experiences. Some Jus-
tices have explicitly treated this value as a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest to justify race-conscious measures in education. And
the Supreme Court as a whole has not yet resolved the issue of what goals
other than overcoming historic discrimination may provide permissible
grounds for race-conscious measures in areas outside education.
Five: The Supreme Court has required that race-conscious remedies be
both effective and fair for the entire community. As Justice Powell states
in Wygant, race-conscious remedies should in general be viewed more fa-
vorably when the incidental burdens entailed by such remedies are spread
equitably. Such remedies should rely neither on rigid quotas nor on empty
gestures of good faith, but on flexible goals, genuinely pursued.
19891 1713
The Yale Law Journal
III. GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE STANDARDS
In developing further the constitutional standards for affirmative action,
we believe it is important that courts and governmental officials keep in
mind the following principles.
First: Pervasive discrimination does not merely operate at the applica-
tion stage; its more subtle and perhaps more serious consequence is to
deter and discourage members of minority groups from even seeking to
enter the market for occupations, business opportunities or homes in cer-
tain neighborhoods. This consequence is an especially appropriate target
of remedial policies. When courts seek to determine the existence and ex-
tent of past discrimination by making statistical comparisons to relevant
labor pools, it is critical that such courts recognize the extent to which
such discrimination may itself have produced smaller numbers in the com-
parable minority population. This may be especially important in the area
of contracting or subcontracting, where the perceived demand for minority
subcontractors may be the determinative factor in minority business for-
mation. Without such consideration of deterrence, courts might well create
a Catch-22 for cities seeking to implement sound affirmative action poli-
cies for subcontracting.
Second: When asking local governments to establish a factual record of
past discrimination, it is essential not to deter voluntary efforts by forcing
such governments to point fingers needlessly or to make compromising
public admissions in order to establish the necessary predicate for race-
conscious remedies. To do so would be to reopen old wounds, not to heal
them. And this is a time for healing.
Third: While cities should be responsible in modifying their programs
to fit the Court's ruling in Croson, they should be allowed sufficient time
to engage in good faith efforts to reevaluate their program in light of that
decision. If their programs are challenged during the period of reevalua-
tion, courts should follow the practical and sensible rule, adopted in anal-
ogous constitutional contexts, that would permit local governments ade-
quate time to establish the relevant factual record needed to respond to
such a challenge.
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